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Coordinating on Reducing Advertising: Carbonated Soft Drinks Industry and 
Combating Obesity 
 
Abstract:  With the rise in obesity levels across the nation, policy makers and public 
interest groups are taking more interest in advertising of unhealthful foods. The Better 
Business Bureau has formed the Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative 
(CFBAI), which has recruited carbonated soft drink (CSD) manufactures to voluntarily 
restrict their advertising directed at children less than 12 years of age. This research 
explores the effects of the CFBAI on firm level advertising to children and adults using 
nonlinear time series processes.  Estimated ARCH processes are significant in all models 
and capture varying pulse-advertising strategies by all major firms. We find that the 
market leader does in fact reduce its advertising to both adults and children and the 
second largest firm reduces advertising to adults. Advertising for the non-participating 
firm, however, increased for adults following the ban. The results emphasize the potential 
benefits and difficulty of coordinating cooperative behavior in this type of industry. It 
appears that policy strategies of this nature may be more effective if directed at industries 
as a whole and not at individual firms. 
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advertising  
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Introduction 
There are a multitude of factors that contribute to the high levels of obesity in the US and 
abroad. As such, researchers, policy makers and public interest groups have been 
attempting to find ways to target those factors which contribute to overconsumption and 
or sedentary lifestyles, which translates into obesity. 
  Over the last few years, advertising for unhealthful foods has been identified as a 
potential contributor to obesity. Advertising directed at children has received especially 
harsh criticism as it generates a high level of anxiety concerning the well being of young 
people. Consequently, several industry-lead initiatives have focused on ways to reduce or 
restrict levels of advertising directed at children, primarily through self-regulation. One 
example is the National Advertising Review Council’s Children’s Advertising Review 
Unit (CARU) which developed Self-Regulatory Guidelines for Children’s Advertising, 
and provides monitoring and scrutiny of advertising directed at children. More recently, 
the Better Business Bureau has formed the Children’s Food and Beverage Advertising 
Initiative (CFBAI), which has recruited firms to voluntarily restrict their advertising to 
children less than 12 years of age. 
  As many firms have voluntarily enrolled in initiatives such as the CFBAI, a 
natural question is what effect has this had on actual advertising levels. For one, even 
though advertising targeted to children may be restricted, children still watch television 
with their parents and older siblings. Even if firms restrict their advertising targeted at 
children, they may still increase their advertising targeted at adults, which could spillover 
to children as well. As a result, a reduction in advertising directed at children may have 
no effect or even a positive effect on children’s advertising exposure.   4 
  Alternatively, it is suggested that oligopoly firms tend to over-advertise as a result 
of market competition and the need to product differentiate (Waldman and Jensen, 2007). 
The result of excessive advertising can be lower profits. While firms could increase their 
profits by reducing advertising levels, in a competitive market there is no incentive for a 
firm to move first; this result is demonstrated in a static game as a stag-hunt outcome. In 
this instance an outside mechanism could help coordinate reduced advertising levels by 
all participating firms. As such, following the CFBAI we might expect a decline in 
advertising to all age groups.  
We estimate a time-series model of advertising by major carbonated soft drink 
(CSD) firms in the US to determine if the restriction on advertising directed at children 
had a statistical impact on their exposure to television advertising. Corresponding to the 
CFBAI initiative, we disaggregate advertising into two groups: advertising to ages under 
12 and ages 12 and older. Rather than focus on expenditures, we measure advertising 
exposure using gross ratings points (GRPs). In addition, we model firm competition using 
a series of nonlinear time series models, which allow the data to determine competitive 
interaction.  
To account for the commonly found heteroscedasticity in error terms of 
advertising data, a novel estimation approach is employed. We hypothesize that the main 
determinant of heteroscedasticity in television advertising models should be attributed to 
the pulse advertising strategy that firms typically utilize.  This advertising strategy is a 
form of volatility clustering, which ARCH structured error terms are used to explicitly 
model (Engle, 1982; Franses and van Dijk, 2000).  Therefore, we estimate a set of ARCH   5 
class models and account for possible competitive interactions among firms using lagged 
values of GRPs. 
As expected, the ARCH processes are significant, supporting the nonlinear model 
that allows for the variance grouping of pulse advertising.  The difference between the 
estimated ARCH coefficients of the three firms suggests that while general advertising 
strategies are similar, specific applications vary across firm.  
The market share leaders, Coca-Cola and Pepsi, exhibit the most significant 
results. The advertising restriction results in a decrease in both children and adult GRPs 
purchased by Coke and a decrease in adult GRPs purchased by Pepsi
1.  Therefore, it 
appears that the planned advertising restriction helped coordinate decreased advertising 
by participating CSD firms.  The effect that this voluntary advertising ban had on GRPs 
appears to be much larger than first anticipated with decreased exposure of unhealthful 
foods to both children and adults. Following the voluntary ban on advertising, GRPs for 
adults increased for the non-participating firm, Dr. Pepper
2. As the leading CSD firms 
decreased advertising, Dr. Pepper increased their GRPs.   
The outcome of the presented model demonstrates the need for empirical analysis 
of non-market policy interventions and highlights the potential benefits and difficulty of 
coordinating cooperative behavior in this type of industry. Indeed, policy strategy of this 
type may be more effective if it gains industry-wide acceptance. 
Motivation 
                                                 
1 The effect on children’s GRPs was negative but not significant. 
2 The effect on children’s GRPs was positive but insignificant.   6 
At a basic level, the purpose of advertising is to encourage consumers to purchase new 
products (increase demand), continue to buy certain products (prevent a reduction in 
demand), and make their willingness to pay for the product higher (rotate demand). 
Effective advertising then may lead to consumption of products that may not have 
otherwise been consumed (Dixit and Norman 1978). This causes some concern if the 
products have low nutritional value. This concern is especially poignant if the advertising 
is directed at children, as children are generally more susceptible to the effects of 
advertising (Friestad and Wright, 2005; Oates, Blades and Gunter, 2003). Additionally, 
research has identified, to some extent, a relationship between advertising and obesity, 
leading some to worry that advertising contributes to the growing obesity epidemic. For 
example, Chou, Rashad and Grossman (2008) find a positive relationship between 
children viewing TV ads for fast food restaurants, obesity and the probability of being 
overweight. Andreyeva, Kelly and Harris (2011) find that fast food advertising is 
associated with significantly higher weight outcomes for overweight and obese children 
as well
3. 
  Advertising is clearly an important consideration for firms as well. While 
advertising may increase demand, it is not without cost. For one, there is the financial 
burden of advertising. Since the economic impact of advertising is often difficult to 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, Holt et al. (2007) find that children were not exposed to more food 
advertisements in 2004 than in 1977 and they find no evidence that children are seeing 
more advertising for low nutrition foods over the same time period. Zywicki, Holt and 
Ohlhausen (2004) further emphasize that food marketing to children has not grown 
during the same time that obesity has increased.   7 
evaluate, firms are pressed to justify their advertising budget, especially in times of fiscal 
scarcity. Beyond that, some advertising can also contribute to a negative public image, as 
is the case with advertising directed at children. If advertising is costly and at the same 
time draws negative public attention, firms may be willing to reduce their level of 
advertising to reduce costs and improve their public image. However, firms may face a 
competitive environment where their decision to advertise is affected by other firms’ 
behavior. More specifically, the benefit of restricting advertising may be conditional on 
cooperative behavior of all firms.  
We discuss a simple two player Stag-Hunt game as an example (Figure 1). Each 
firm faces the discrete choice to advertise high or low. The payoff for each firm,
i p , is 
conditional on their own advertising choice and their competitors advertising choice. 
Since advertising is costly to the firm (due to financial costs and social perception) we 
assume that the high level advertising payoff is less than the low level advertising payoff. 
This is the excessive advertising argument which suggests that firms invest in too much 
advertising due to competition and that if they reduced their advertising, their costs would 
decline (without hurting their revenues) and their profits would go up. If advertising to 
children is receiving negative public attention, then advertising would in fact be 
excessive if the marginal costs of public attention outweigh the marginal benefits from 
increased demand.  
Noting firm 1’s choice with the first subscript and firm 2’s with the second 
subscript, the payoffs for firm 1 and firm2 are ordered as:
1 1 1 1
LH HH HL LL p p p p > ³ > and 
2 2 2 2
HL HH LH LL p p p p > ³ > respectively. In a Stag-Hunt, as opposed to a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
there are two pure Nash equilibria, one where both players choose to defect (advertise   8 
high) and one where both choose to cooperate (advertise low). In our simple example, the 
decision to cooperate (advertise low, advertise low) provides a larger overall profit for 
both players. However, if both firms are already at the risk dominant payoff (advertise 
high, advertise high), they will continue to advertise high and receive lower profits. 
Clearly this creates a coordination problem between the firms. If they can simultaneously 
agree to advertise low, both firms could receive higher profits.  
The introduction of the CFBAI could coordinate advertising reductions by 
participating firms. Essentially, the CFBAI provides the opportunity for any one firm to 
signal their desire for coordination without incurring any actual losses. That is, any firm 
can signal their intention to reduce their advertising by joining the CFBAI. If no other 
firms in the industry were to mimic this behavior, the initial firm could potentially excuse 
itself from participating in the CFBAI.  
  While it is possible that oligopolists in a market would be willing to reduce 
advertising levels given some coordination, there are other potential outcomes as well. 
Advertising to adults reaches a broader audience of decision makers. The introduction of 
the CFBAI could direct firm advertising expenditures from lower-return advertising 
(targeted at children) to higher return advertising (targeted at adults). As such, the 
implementation of the CFBAI may result in a reduction in advertising to children and an 
increase in advertising to adults. Finally, it is important to note that even if advertising 
directed at children is restricted, children’s exposure to advertising may not change (or it   9 




The CSD market in the United States can be characterized as an oligopoly dominated by 
three major firms, Coca-Cola Company, PepsiCo Inc and Dr. Pepper-Snapple Group Inc. 
The industry relies largely on advertising with the majority of advertising expenditures 
going to television advertising and the majority of television advertising allocated to the 
major brand products for each company: the majority of Coca-Cola advertising 
expenditures are for Coca-Cola, PepsiCo Inc advertises Pepsi and Dr. Pepper-Snapple 
Group Inc. advertises Dr. Pepper. Not only do the major CSD brands receive the largest 
share of advertising expenditures, they are also advertised the most frequently. Some 
seasonal or promotional CSDs are advertised for a single period of time, whereas the 
major brands benefit from advertising pulsing strategies in which repetitive pulses of 
advertising occur with a certain frequency throughout the year. Rather than using data 
disaggregated by brand, the time series used in this research provide weekly measures of 
national advertising GRPs by parent company for five different age groups from January 
2006 to December 2008 (152 weeks)
5. GRPs are a measure of the number of people who 
see an advertisement multiplied by the frequency that it is viewed.  
                                                 
4 Advertising to children is generally defined by the composition of the audience viewing 
the advertisement. For example, if 50 percent of the audience for a commercial is adults, 
then the advertisement is considered adult advertising by many company standards.  
5 National advertising includes network, cable and syndicated advertising.    10 
The data also captures the introduction of the Children’s Food and Beverage 
Advertising Initiative (CFBAI). The two largest CSD firms (Coca-Cola and Pepsi) 
voluntarily joined the CFBAI; however, the terms of their participation vary. For 
example, Coca-Cola was one of four companies to completely stop advertising directed 
to children where child directed advertising is defined as having 50 percent of more of 
the audience profile being children under 12
6. In fact, Coca-cola claims that it has never 
advertised to children based on these standards (see Coca-Cola’s CFBAI pledge, 
http://www.bbb.org/us/children-advertising-initiative/Coca-Cola/). Alternatively, Pepsi 
agreed to restrict their under 12 advertising to products that meet their SmartSpot 
nutrition guidelines, where regular CSDs do not meet these guidelines 
(http://www.pepsico.com/Download/PepsiCo_Pledge.pdf). Pepsi committed to 
implement their restrictions by January 1, 2008. Prior to this in 2005, Pepsi voluntarily 
restricted advertising their flagship cola (Pepsi) to children under 12 (Ward and Grant, 
2005). These standards do not mean that children never see advertising for CSDs from 
Pepsi or Coca-Cola, only that those companies do not target audiences comprised of 
children (Coca-Cola) or advertise unhealthful products to children (Pepsi). Clearly there 
is room for questioning the effectiveness of these standards. At the same time, January 1, 
2008 provides an opportunity to examine if Pepsi implemented any significant changes to 
their advertising to both children and adult advertising. Further, Pepsi’s implementation 
date may have allowed Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper to simultaneously reduce their 
advertising. That is, if Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper were aware that Pepsi intended to 
                                                 
6 Coca-cola has since amended this pledge to be an audience profile of children under 12 
greater than 35 percent. However, our data set reflects the 50 percent level.    11 
reduce their advertising, they may have done the same. To date, Dr. Pepper-Snapple 
Group Inc. has not joined the CFBAI.  
To match our data to the advertising restriction guidelines we aggregate our five 
age groups into two groups: children (under 12) and teenager/adults (12 and older). It is 
important to note that the GRPs used in this data only identify if a child or adult saw an 
advertisement or a certain product, but it does not distinguish the type of advertisement 
that was seen. Advertising directed at children may also generate GRPs for adults who 
are also watching the advertisement. Likewise, advertising directed at adults may also 
generate GRPs for children who view the advertisement. 
In Figures 2-4 we plot the aggregate advertising GRPs for all regular CSDs 
owned by Coca-Cola, Dr. Pepper and Pepsi respectively, broken down by children and 
teenager/adults. As shown, the GRPs for children tend to follow the GRPs for adults, 
with the level of advertising for adults almost consistently higher than that for children. 
Adult advertising is generally during prime-time advertising spots and thus is more 
expensive. The summer time advertising tends to be more active and there are also two 
peaks for Coca-Cola, which appear to correspond to the Winter Olympics (February 
2006) and Summer Olympics (August 2008), which Coca-Cola sponsors. The advertising 
frequency for Dr. Pepper appears to increase each year. In 2006, Dr. Pepper’s advertising 
pulsing starts in April. In 2007, their advertising pulsing starts in January. Finally in 
2008, we notice that advertising starts in January and lasts until August and appears to 
have greater frequency i.e., more peaks. 
In Table 1 we show average weekly real advertising expenditures for all three 
firms for regular and diet soft drinks by year. Coke spends the most each year, followed   12 
by Pepsi and Dr. Pepper. Dr. Pepper puts a much greater emphasis on regular soft drinks 
whereas Pepsi spends relatively more on diet soft drinks. It appears that all three firms 
reduced their expenditures from 2006, suggesting a slow down in advertising which may 
be related to a decline in consumption or a slow down in the economy. After the end of 
2007 expenditures for regular CSDs recovered for Coke and Pepsi, but at a modest rate. 
This could be due to a continual downward trend in the economy and is not necessarily 
associated with the CFBAI. Dr. Pepper, on the other hand, exhibits a much greater 
increase in expenditures for regular soft drinks in 2008. It is not clear based on this 
preliminary analysis if this is related to the CFBAI, but it does appear that the change in 
Dr. Pepper’s expenditures were greater than the two leading firms.  
The standard deviation of expenditures provides interesting information as well. 
For all three companies, the standard deviation of expenditures declines from 2006 to 
2007. In 2008, the deviation increases greatly for Coke and Pepsi but remains low for Dr. 
Pepper. This shows that Coke and Pepsi advertising becomes much more sporadic, 
whereas Dr. Pepper’s advertising is more consistent. As a prelude to our empirical model, 
this also suggests that our estimation approach should account for erratic variation. 
Unfortunately, the expenditure data is not disaggregated by age group. However, 
we can compare the data on children and adult GRP’s for each of the firms. In Table 2 we 
report the sum of GRPs for children and adults by year. For both Pepsi and Coke, we 
notice a consistent pattern of declining GRPs each year for both age groups. Again, this is 
likely due to the declining economy. For Dr. Pepper, however, the sum of GRPs increases 
from 2007 to 2008 for both children and adults.  This may not be directly attributable to   13 
the CFBAI as other factors may also have an effect, but it does show that the behavior of 
Dr. Pepper varies compared to Coke and Pepsi.  
Exploratory Regression Analysis 
While CSD advertising behavior is clearly a time-series question, we initially examine 
the advertising data to determine if the implementation date of the CFBAI had an effect 
on firm GRPs. We combine each of the firm’s 152 weeks of advertising data into a panel 
and estimate the following model:  
(1)  ( )( ) it i it it it it
g
it Pepsi Coke CFBAI Oly z GRP e a b d g + + + + × + × + ¢ = 1 . 
GRP is for firm i at time t for group g (children, adult). The vector z contains firm sales 
and advertising prices. Oly is a dummy variable to indicate when the Olympics are being 
held and CFBAI is a dummy variable to indicate the implementation of the CFBAI. Since 
we want to compare the effect between the three firms, we also include two dummy 
variables to identify different effects for Coke and Pepsi. We include firm fixed 
effects, i a , and cluster the errors by firm.  
To measure the cost of advertising we considered several different approaches. 
Our data provides advertising expenditures per advertisement allowing us to calculate the 
price paid for GRPs. This price time series is likely to be endogenous, however. As an 
alternative we use the Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index (PPP) for 
television broadcasting. While this is not a perfect measure of the cost for advertising 
GRPs, it represents the costs of television broadcasts and is likely correlated with the 
prices that would be charged for advertising by television companies to raise revenues. 
The sales data are taken from 16 major metropolitan regions in the US and is an   14 
approximate measure of national weekly sales by each firm. Since sales is likely to be 
endogenous, we use sales lagged by 1 period.  
We report the estimates for equation (1) in Table 3. The estimates for children 
GRPs (column 1) show that the Olympics has a significant impact on CSD firms with 
Coke increasing their advertising GRPs to children and Dr. Pepper and Pepsi decreasing 
their advertising GRPs to children. The lag of sales (L1.sales) has a significant positive 
effect on children GRPs as well. The sign on prices (ppitv) is negative as expected, but 
insignificant. The parameters of interest are the CFBAI dummy variables. Based on our 
model estimates, the implementation of the CFBAI lead to a decrease in both Coke and 
Pepsi’s advertising GRPs for children. This is not surprising for Pepsi, as they pledged to 
reduce advertising to children by their implementation date. The fact that Coke also 
appears to follow suit suggests that their may be some coordination effect. Alternatively, 
Dr. Pepper GRPs to children significantly increased following the implementation of the 
CFBAI.  
The estimates for adult GRPs (column 2) show similar results as the model for 
children. Most interesting is the significant change in adult GRPs for all three firms. 
Again, Pepsi and Coke reduce their advertising to adults while Dr. Pepper increases their 
advertising to adults. This result is interesting considering that the CFBAI pertains to 
advertising to children, not adults.  
The results provide preliminary evidence that the CFBAI may have had an effect 
on firm advertising behavior. At the same time, however, there are clearly time series 
dynamics not being considered in this estimation. While dynamic panel series estimation 
is possible, the majority of statistical tests rely on panels where both N and T are large   15 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Since our N = 3, we will rely on time-series methods using 
separate equations for each firm (described in the next section).  
Theoretical Model 
The most common approach to examining firm behavior is to specify a profit maximizing 
model and estimate various forms of interfirm competition. When firm pricing behavior 
is of concern, this is the ideal approach. Given the vast number of firm products and our 
interest in advertising behavior, we find it parsimonious to focus on just firm advertising. 
To estimate the effect of the implementation of the CFBAI on firm’s weekly GRPs, we 
employ duality results of the cost minimization problem to specify advertising GRPs as a 
factor of production, thereby separating advertising from the firm pricing decision and 
consumer demand. In this approach, we assume that different factors are used for 
production and advertising of the firm’s product, allowing for separability of the cost 
function as  ( ) ( ) ( ) Q P Q W Q P W A P ; ; ; , f f + = F  where W is a vector of prices for 
production inputs, P is a vector of prices for advertising media, Q is the desired level of 
output,  ( ) Q W P ; f is the production cost function and  ( ) Q P A ; f is the advertising cost 
function. Implicitly then, this framework separates out a firms cost of advertising 
required to achieve some desired level of output without having to explicitly model 
demand. As suggested by Seldon et al. (2000), one theoretical justification for separating 
production and advertising is that advertising can be altered after production has 
occurred.  
Focusing on the advertising cost function, the minimization problem is: 
( ) A Q that such P A A A G = ¢ = f min , where A is a vector of advertising units and  ( ) A G  is a   16 
function that translates the number of advertising units into the desired output. Solving 
the minimization problem produces a vector of advertising equations, 
(2)  ( ) Q P A A , = .                    
Corresponding to our data set, the advertising units, A, are the number of GRPs 
selected by a firm. Specifying GRPs as a factor of production may not be intuitive, since 
firms purchase advertising blocks from networks. However, the decision of how much to 
spend for a block of advertising is a function of how many GRPs will be acquired in a 
block of advertising. Given that advertising is purchased via competitive advertising 
markets, firms understand the number of GRPs that can be acquired for a given price. For 
example, if a firm has a limited budget, they can acquire low-cost GRPs, which typically 
consist of an advertising block aired during non-prime-time viewing. 
Several other papers have used a cost-minimization approach to examine 
advertising behavior of firms. Seldon et al. (2000) specifies a translog cost function and 
solve for the factors of production to examine beer industry advertising shares. Silk et al. 
(2002) also specify a translog model to examine eight different forms of national media 
advertising in the US. Fare et al. (2004) and Vardanyan and Tremblay (2006) study the 
beer industry and use a cost minimization approach to evaluate the efficiency of firm 
advertising decisions. Finally, Iwasaki and Tremblay (2009) examine how advertising 
regulations impact efficiency in the cigarette industry.  
  It is common, as in the literature cited above, to estimate the factors of production 
given by equation 2 by specifying a functional form. Specifically, the cost function, 
( ) Q P A ; f , is specified using a flexible functional form such as the translog and the factors 
of production are recovered using Shephard’s lemma. Adding such structure ensures   17 
consistency with economic theory, however it also imposes restrictions on the model. As 
noted by Manera (2006, p 128) regarding such models, “The variables of an economic 
system are interrelated in a complex way, where non-stationarities, dynamics and specific 
events play a crucial role.” Further, the data generation process may not be known to the 
econometrician and will contain both deterministic and stochastic components. As 
opposed to enforcing structure on the cost minimization problem a few authors specify 
linear models, and instead focus on the dynamic processes affecting the error term. 
Manera (2006), for example, employs a vector auto-regressive model (VAR) with 
deterministic components. Hyde and Gloy (2007) also use a VAR model to examine 
competitive advertising between branded and generic meat. Steenkamp et al. (2005) 
specify a VAR model to simultaneously examine advertising, pricing and market shares.  
The potential benefit of a data driven time-series approach such as a VAR model 
is that instead of enforcing restrictions on the model, the researcher lets the data describe 
the interactions. Advertising strategies of firms are complex and the interactions of firm 
competition are dynamic and complex as well. Many researchers choose to provide 
structure and assume some type of formal competition (for example, Cournot or Bertrand 
behavior) or some dynamic equilibrium process such as Markov-Perfect Equilibrium. 
While such approaches are clearly important, it can be difficult to account for structural 
change in the market since the behavior of the game being played is likely to change as 
well (Perloff, Karp and Golan 2007). 
A VAR model of advertising factors can be specified as, 
(3)  t t t z A L B e a + × = ) ( ,                   18 
where over some time trend t,  t z is a vector of deterministic components (constant term, 
time trend, structural breaks, seasonal variable, etc.), B(L) is a p
th order matrix 
polynomial in the lag operator L, and  t e is a vector of i.i.d. normally distributed error 
terms. The vector  t A contains elements representing advertising GRPs for all firms in the 
industry. 
While the lagged time series model (equation 3) allows for dynamic interaction 
among firms, it neglects to account for commonly used pulse advertising strategies 
undertaken by firms.  Statistically speaking, pulse advertising can be viewed as a form of 
volatility clustering, where periods of high volumes of advertising, and GRPs, appear as 
regions of increased volatility in a time series and are typically followed with low periods 
of advertising, represented as regions of low volatility.  These regions are easily 
identified in a plot of Coca-Cola GRPs (Figure 2). For example, in 2008 there are four 
periods where GRPs peak, with the largest peak occurring August 1st.  
To account for pulse advertising in GRP’s we specify equation (3) as a system of 
independent time series equations with autoregressive conditional hetersokedastic 
(ARCH) error terms as well as a set of exogenous variables. ARCH time series models 
were originally developed to account for variance clustering in financial time series 
(Engle, 1982). For each of the i firms, the error term,ei,t, is assumed to be conditionally 
heteroskedastic and is modeled using an ARCH model of order p such 
that t i t i t i h w , , , = e and 
2
, , p t i i i t i h - + = h l w , where  t i w ,  is i.i.d. with zero mean and unit 
variance,  i w and i l are parameters to be estimated, and the series  t i, h  is conditionally 
homoskedastic. The use of ARCH class models over VAR class models will allow for a   19 
more efficient specification of the nonlinear dynamic process involved in CSD 
advertising.  The interaction between firms is specified as independent lagged variables 
in each CSD firm’s equation of GRPs. 
Empirical approach  
We specify equation (3) to estimate advertising GRPs for children under 12 and teens and 
adults for each of the three CSD firms’ non-diet major brands resulting in six reduced 
form equations: 


















t i ¹ + + + = ∑∑ ∑ ∑ - - , , 1 , , , , , , , , e d b a .       
For the i = 3 firms, the advertising equations are for g = children or adult advertising 
GRPs over t =152 weeks.  t m i z , , contains m exogenous time varying variables specific to 
each firm, including an intercept, a dummy variable to capture the effects of the winter 
and summer Olympics, the national producer price index for television advertising, and 
an estimate of total sales for the respective CSD firms over 16 major markets in the US. It 
also includes the variable of interest, a dummy variable identifying the implementation of 
the CFBAI. The a ’s are parameters to be estimated corresponding to each of the 
exogenous variables. Theb ’s are parameters to be estimated corresponding to own-firm 
lagged advertising and thed ’s are parameters to be estimated corresponding to 
competitor j lagged advertising. Each equation has k AR lags, l lagged competitor GRPs, 
and p ARCH lags. The optimal number of AR lags k and l, and ARCH lags p, are 
selected based on overall model fit, consistency across firm equations, t-statistics, Log 
Likelihood estimates, and the Akaike Information Criterion (Tsay, 2002).  
Identification   20 
The choice to restrict advertising by firms is clearly endogenous to their advertising 
behavior. Estimating the effect of the CFBAI based on the date that firms chose to join 
the initiative would create bias, as it would be correlated with unobserved variables 
captured by the error term. However, we estimate the effect of the CFBAI based on the 
actual implementation date of the advertising restriction, which is not necessarily chosen 
by the firms. Further, the implementation data we examine in this analysis is relevant for 
Pepsi, not the other firms. An important question then is whether or not unobserved 
factors that affect Pepsi’s weekly advertising decisions are correlated with the 
implementation of the CFBAI. If advertising is planned far enough in advance, there 
could be unobservables which affect the stream of advertising we observe in our data that 
also have an effect on the chosen implementation date for the advertising restriction. As 
such, the dummy variable for the CFBAI would be correlated with the error term for the 
Pepsi model. Given the dynamic nature of advertising, however, it would seem unlikely 
that any decision to restrict future advertising would be highly correlated with factors that 
affect the choice of advertising GRPs in the future. For one, changing market conditions 
affect advertising costs and therefore advertising choices. While Pepsi might anticipate 
changes in market competition and adjust their advertising accordingly, there are 
numerous exogenous factors, such as the recent economic crisis, that they could not 
account for. They could plan for future prices based on expectations of competitive 
behavior, but the changing economy would ensure instability of prices and therefore 
varying advertising expenditures. For example, the economic crisis in the US has lead to 
a reduction in advertising by many large advertising firms, creating a greater supply of 
available television advertising time. Finally, changes in consumer behavior would likely   21 
have an affect on advertising decisions as well. As obesity concerns have spread there has 
been a growing trend away from carbonated soft drinks. We assume that the 
implementation of the CFBAI initiative is exogenous to the stream of Pepsi advertising 
GRPs we observe in our data. 
Another important consideration lies with the general Dorfman-Steiner result, 
which implies that firms select prices and advertising simultaneously. In our modeling 
approach we treat the desired output (Q) as chosen and then select the appropriate 
advertising level to achieve that output. If prices were simultaneously chosen with 
advertising, then prices would be endogenous to the advertising equations. We would 
then have to account for this in our estimation. There are two reasons why simultaneity of 
prices and advertising is not a concern in our approach. First, we use national level 
advertising data, whereas prices that directly affect demand (i.e. output) are set by 
retailers at the store level. From the firm’s perspective, advertising and retail prices are 
not simultaneously chosen. Second, even if the firm has some expectations of retail price 
mark-ups and coordinates advertising and pricing decisions, this would occur at a 
regional level since prices vary by location. As such, we would expect regional spot 
market advertising to be correlated with regional retail prices. In fact, the greatest 
variation in city-level advertising is explained by spot market advertising
7. As our 
analysis relies on national level advertising, we assume that pricing is not endogenous to 
our estimation. 
Empirical Findings 
                                                 
7 There is also variation in advertising due to cable advertising and syndication 
advertising, but far less than spot market advertising.    22 
We present the results of six time series equations (Tables 4-6).  As expected, the ARCH 
processes are significant in all models supporting the hypothesis that the use of pulse-
advertising strategies has a significant effect on overall model fit.  The AR lags are 
significant for Coke, Pepsi, and Dr. Pepper at varying degrees suggesting that the time 
series approach is effective at capturing the dynamic advertising behavior of the firms. 
Further, we find that the appropriate AR lag structure based on various fit criteria is to 
include four period lags in each equation. In addition to model fit criteria the time series 
parameters are specified the same for all equations for consistency and to allow for 
comparison of potentially different advertising strategies.  Indeed, the estimated ARCH 
coefficients and autoregressive lags are different between CSD firms and between age 
groups, suggesting that general advertising strategies vary across manufactures.  While 
the time series lags are not individually interpretable due to their interaction with each 
other and the ARCH parameters, it appears that the majority of all non-redundant 
dynamic processes are confined to a single month’s periods. 
The equations for the market share leaders, Coca-Cola (Table 4) and Pepsi (Table 
6), exhibit the most statistically significant results. The advertising restriction parameter 
identifies a significant decrease in Coke GRPs for both children and adults and Pepsi 
GRPs for adults
8. The fact that Pepsi’s children GRPs do not have a significant change is 
not terribly surprising since they had already voluntarily restricted advertising their 
flagship soda in 2005. However, as previously discussed, it is interesting to find that 
Coca-Cola’s advertising to children significantly changed. As suggested earlier, this 
                                                 
8 The CFBAI had a negative effect on Pepsi’s GRPs for children, but this value was not 
significant at the 10 percent level.    23 
outcome may have been motivated by a coordinated effort to move to higher profit 
equilibrium. That is, if Coca-Cola suspected that Pepsi would reduce their advertising, 
they may have decided to do the same.  
The fact that advertising to adults also decreased implies that participating firms 
did not attempt to increase their advertising to adults to compensate for reduced 
advertising to children. Just because firms do not advertise directly to children does not 
guarantee that children will not be exposed to advertising. Firms could increase their 
advertising directed at adults with the anticipation that children would also see the 
advertising. Rather, their overall advertising levels appeared to have decreased.  
It is important to note that participating firms could have only reduced their 
advertising targeted to children and the impact on adults was a consequence of reduced 
spillover from children’s advertising. That is, less advertising directed at children meant 
less advertising for adults as well. While this might have some impact on the results, the 
magnitude of the effects suggests that this does not explain the entire effect. Many adults 
do not have children; as such the reduction in children’s advertising would have a 
minimal impact on adults GRPs.  
The voluntary ban on advertising appears to have had an opposite effect on the 
non-participating firm. Dr. Pepper’s adult GRPs (Table 5) increased after the onset of the 
CFBAI ban and the sign on the children’s GRPs was positive, although not significant. 
As the leading CSD firms decreased advertising, Dr. Pepper increased their GRPs. 
Whether this decision was solely in reaction to the behavior of the other firms is 
indiscernible. It could be that Dr. Pepper anticipated the advertising reductions and then 
chose to increase their advertising levels to attempt to gain market share. At the same   24 
time, however, if the two largest CSDs reduced their advertising expenditures the price of 
advertising would decrease and the availability of advertising would increase, reducing 
the cost of advertising to others in the market. The optimal advertising decision as 




Whatever the exact motivation for the advertising increase by Dr. Pepper, the results 
emphasize the potential difficulty of coordinating cooperative behavior in this type of 
industry. Firms in such oligopolistic industries are highly competitive and product 
differentiation is key to maintaining profits. As such, advertising plays an important role 
in creating brand value.  
The Olympics dummy variable is significant and negative for Pepsi and positive 
for Coca-Cola, the official sponsor of the Olympics. This captures the ramp up of 
advertising by Coke and the reaction by Pepsi, which is to reduce their advertising. This 
highlights interesting behavior by Pepsi; instead of attempting to combat Coke’s 
advertising campaign they instead reduce their expenditures. Television advertising 
prices (PPITV) are significant for Pepsi with a negative signed coefficient whereas they 
are not significantly different from zero for Coca-Cola or Dr. Pepper. This could suggest 
that the marginal cost of advertising does not affect Coca-Cola or Dr. Pepper as much as 
Pepsi. It may also be that PPI for TV broadcasting does not sufficiently capture the price 
of advertising for these firms. Individual sales and competitor GRP’s are significant at 
various levels for the different CSD firms. 
Implications of Results 
Due to a coordinated initiative by the Better Business Bureau, the two leading CSD firms 
agreed to reduce advertising directed at children under the age of 12. While it is easy to   25 
observe that advertising targeted at children did stop at a certain date, the actual impact 
on advertising effectiveness as measured by GRPs was not clear and various possibilities 
existed as to the actual outcome.  Ex ante, a net increase or decrease in GRPs for both the 
younger and older age groups could be expected. In addition to restricting advertising to 
children, firms could choose to reduce, increase or maintain advertising to adults, which 
would have varying effects on the amount of advertising children see. 
  Empirically, we find that GRPs were negatively affected for both children and 
adults for the two largest firms with the onset of the CFBAI.  The effectiveness of this 
policy creates hope for future efforts to reduce incentives of unhealthy eating.  Whether 
television advertisements have a significant effect on childhood obesity is of lesser 
importance in this case as we see a possible Pareto improving outcome where the 
participating firms reduce potentially excessive operating expenses.  On the other hand, it 
appears the CFBAI has had a different effect on nonparticipating firms.  Those not 
directly involved in the agreement now appear to be benefiting in a non-cooperative way.  
There is an important tradeoff for firms to consider when deciding to regulate 
their own advertising. Advertising generates lasting goodwill for a firm’s product. 
Advertising goodwill, much like other forms of capital, depreciates over time and 
requires maintained investment. At the same time, voluntarily reducing advertising to 
children also creates goodwill with the public. Firms must consider the tradeoff of 
advertising goodwill with public goodwill. That is, the benefit they get from advertising 
their products versus the benefit they get from being perceived as being socially 
responsible. To this point, it is perhaps less surprising that Pepsi would play a role in the 
CFBAI as they are part of larger brand, PepsiCo Inc, which produces a broad range of   26 
products, not just soft drinks. As such, they may have more to gain in terms of public 
goodwill. While Coco-Cola is primarily a beverage company, they are the largest 
beverage firm in the world and have more at stake with the public. Alternatively, Dr. 
Pepper is the third largest carbonated soft drink firm and may have more to gain from 
increasing their advertising expenditures rather than appealing to public goodwill. It 
appears that policy strategies of this nature may be more effective if directed at industries 
as a whole and not at individual firms. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Weekly national advertising expenditures for diet and regular CSDs by firm, and 
year ($1,000’s). 
Manufacturer Year Average St. Deviation Average St. Deviation
Coca-Cola 2006 2,734 $    3,019 $            1,728 $    2,378 $           
2007 1,751 $    2,681 $            1,137 $    1,753 $           
2008 1,785 $    3,271 $            1,204 $    1,923 $           
Dr. Pepper 2006 1,190 $    1,161 $            790 $       1,310 $           
2007 857 $       962 $               407 $       731 $              
2008 967 $       969 $               270 $       722 $              
Pepsi 2006 1,272 $    801 $               1,624 $    1,618 $           
2007 864 $       692 $               1,280 $    1,206 $           
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Table 2. Yearly national advertising GRPs for regular CSDs by firm, age group, and year.  
Manufacturer Year Children Adult Children Adult
Coca-Cola 2006 3618.92 11996.73 -- --
2007 2495.36 6881.83 (1,123.56)    (5,114.90)   
2008 1199.13 4042.41 (1,296.22)    (2,839.43)   
Dr. Pepper 2006 1850.92 7128.40 -- --
2007 1735.57 7311.28 (115.35)       182.88       
2008 2155.72 8612.42 420.15        1,301.14    
Pepsi 2006 2593.11 9372.76 -- --
2007 1683.77 6802.35 (909.35)       (2,570.41)   
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Table 3. Results of panel data estimation. 
variable children adult
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Table 4. Results of ARCH models of children and adult advertising for Coke. 
 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Variable Coefficient S.E.
L1.Pepsi adv -0.150 0.014 L1.Pepsi adv -0.008 0.010
L1.Dr.P adv 0.010 0.019 L1.Dr.P adv -0.038 0.007
olympics 84.091 7.687 olympics 305.012 10.704
cfbai -8.518 1.795 cfbai -22.922 3.877
L1.Coke Sales 11.226 3.060 L1.Coke Sales -25.379 6.338
ppitv 9.938 10.194 ppitv 27.726 31.943
constant -196.394 52.882 constant 452.705 112.766
L1. -0.066 0.031 L1. 0.171 0.022
L2. 0.136 0.031 L2. 0.267 0.015
L3. 0.228 0.027 L3. 0.220 0.017
L4. 0.307 0.025 L4. 0.043 0.011
L1. 3.774 0.566 L1. 6.231 0.656
constant 0.638 4.079 constant 0.073 5.973
n 152 n 152
Chi-squared (12) 3358.18 Chi-squared (12) 7498.19
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Table 5. Results of ARCH models of children and adult advertising for Dr. Pepper. 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Variable Coefficient S.E.
L1.Coke adv 0.062 0.015 L1.Coke adv 0.092 0.025
L1.Pepsi adv 0.222 0.026 L1.Pepsi adv 0.253 0.030
olympics -5.009 7.618 olympics -65.872 49.070
cfbai 5.212 4.527 cfbai 43.497 17.769
L1.Dr.P. sales 9.624 5.911 L1.Dr.P. sales -32.831 30.026
ppitv 17.048 43.195 ppitv 46.784 209.566
constant -157.781 95.507 constant 557.849 478.001
L1. 0.282 0.051 L1. 0.124 0.043
L2. 0.609 0.042 L2. 0.686 0.034
L3. -0.186 0.039 L3. -0.264 0.043
L4. 0.026 0.036 L4. 0.097 0.037
L1. 3.742 0.638 L1. 3.373 0.632
constant 36.928 16.217 constant 1110.828 758.589
n 152 n 152
Chi-squared (12) 1099.63 Chi-squared (12) 1439.2
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Table 6. Results of ARCH models of children and adult advertising for Pepsi. 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Variable Coefficient S.E.
L1.Coke adv 0.038 0.044 L1.Coke adv 0.041 0.050
L1.Dr.P. adv -0.013 0.043 L1.Dr.P. adv -0.018 0.038
olympics -18.513 10.656 olympics -52.017 30.882
cfbai -6.733 6.648 cfbai -42.288 19.971
L1.Pepsi Sales 19.770 11.225 L1.Pepsi Sales 70.827 36.823
ppitv -287.023 141.552 ppitv -1019.924 428.012
constant -19.124 227.903 constant -67.381 749.782
L1. 0.570 0.107 L1. 0.499 0.113
L2. -0.097 0.118 L2. -0.056 0.115
L3. -0.003 0.130 L3. -0.040 0.118
L4. -0.146 0.106 L4. -0.170 0.104
L1. 0.143 0.116 L1. 0.168 0.127
constant 433.328 49.453 constant 5129.740 691.143
n 152 n 152
Chi-squared (12) 45.88 Chi-squared (12) 47.71
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Figure 2. Coca-Cola GRPs for children under 12 and teens and adults. 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Dr. Pepper GRPs for children under 12 and teens and adults. 
 
 



















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. Pepsi GRPs for children under 12 and teens and adults. 
 